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Between Care and Conflict:
Relations of Resource Extraction
in the Peruvian Amazon
JUAN PABLO SARMIENTO BARLETTI
University of Sussex, UK
The article examines the ‘contradiction’ between indigenous Amazonian
people’s opposition to hydrocarbon extraction and their participation in
different scales of logging. It considers the literature on conflicts over
resource extraction from the experiences of Joel Bardales, an Ashéninka
man who leads both logging ventures and protests against hydrocarbon
extraction. While scholarly debates emphasise collective responses, the
article emphasises individual experiences as they motivate different strate-
gies vis-à-vis resource extraction. Joel’s statements, stemming from a con-
text of a relational moral economy, reveal a position that does not reject
resource extraction, but its refusal to engage in reciprocal relationships
of care.
Keywords: development, environmental conflicts, extractive governance,
indigenous politics, political ecology, political ontology.
Joel Bardales is not a typical Ashéninka man. Born in 1962, he was a schoolteacher
before leading the indigenous militia that defeated Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
in Ucayali region’s Atalaya province during Peru’s internal war (1980–2000). Between
2004–2006 he served as mayor of Atalaya, a province of just under 50,000 inhabi-
tants of which two-thirds identify as ‘indigenous’ (INEI, 2017). Since then, Joel has
led protests and negotiations to access funds from the royalties that Pluspetrol pays
the national government for its Camisea natural gas concession – half a day up the
Bajo Urubamba river from the town of Atalaya – and compensation payments for the
impact of its activities on the indigenous communities in the area. When I met him in
2007, Joel’s livelihood was based on extracting timber and planting cacao and coffee in
large gardens he opened in the forests of Nueva Esperanza, his comunidad nativa (native
community, henceforth comunidad/es), the titled territories for indigenous Amazonians
in Peru. Like most comunidades in the area, Nueva Esperanza is a mix of Asháninka
and Ashéninka people with similar sociocultural practices and mutually intelligible lan-
guages (Hvalkof and Veber, 2005); together, Asháninka and Ashéninka people amount
to some 120,000 people in Peru (INEI, 2017). Given their mixture in comunidades and
among my interviewees I refer to them as Asháninka/Ashéninka people in this article.
Camisea became active in 2004 and paid US$6.3 billion in royalties in its first decade
of activity – almost 50 percent of the royalties that Peru received from extractive
ventures that decade (Corral, Henderson and Miranda, 2016). Its impact on the Bajo
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Urubamba’s communities and ecosystems was criticised from early on (Ross, 2009;
Feather, 2011). More recent monitoring revealed that comunidades are ‘worse off than
before [Camisea] in terms of health, nutrition, education, and overall perception of
wellbeing’ (The Guardian, 2016). Camisea is the flagship in the expansion of extractive
concessions in Peru. In 2010, almost 50 percent of its Amazon fell within one of
52 hydrocarbon concessions, compared with only 7.1 percent in 2003; 46 of those
concessions overlapped with comunidades (Finer and Orta-Martínez, 2010). The Bajo
Urubamba valley is surrounded by six other active and proposed hydrocarbon sites,
four sites for hydroelectric megadams and a series of forestry concessions. Timber
companies of different sizes work formally and informally in concessions and the
forests of comunidades: more than 9 million of the 17 million ha classified as forestry
concessions are superimposed on comunidades (Monterroso and Larson, 2018). These
concessions are between 5,000 and 40,000 ha, while the average comunidad in the Bajo
Urubamba is just under 4,800 ha (Saldaña et al., 2019). Formal logging is challenged by
Peru’s legal framework to regulate the forestry sector, which does ‘not take into account
the de facto institutional arrangements that truly support the industry’ (Sears and
Pinedo-Vasquez, 2011). This contributes to a system where between 60 and 80 percent
of timber exports are extracted from areas unauthorised for logging (Mongabay, 2018),
and where many comunidades have been fined for informal timber extraction (Saldaña
et al., 2019).
This article engages with what may be misread as a ‘contradiction’ by observers
expecting indigenous peoples to follow essentialised understandings of ‘environmentally-
friendly’ land and resource management (see Ramos, 1994 and Conklin and Gra-
ham, 1997 for critiques), as hydrocarbon extraction is contested by the same people
involved in the logging ventures that have contributed to making Atalaya the sec-
ond most deforested province in Peru (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2019). Rather than
denouncing this ‘contradiction’ as the eradication of Asháninka/Ashéninka people’s
‘culture’, I examine life history interviews with Joel to show how individual accounts
can reveal the micropolitics of engagement strategies with different kinds of resource
extraction, including conflict and collaboration. Building on Joel’s experiences, medi-
ated by my wider engagement with Asháninka/Ashéninka people, I approach conflicts
over natural resource extraction in Atalaya as arising from a mismatch between how
the main actors in hydrocarbon extraction engage with indigenous peoples, and the
latter’s expectations of reciprocal relationships of care that support people’s strategies
for self-sufficiency and autonomy, which they perceive to hold with timber industry
actors. Exploring Joel’s statements in the context of a relational moral economy reveals
a position that does not reject extraction itself but rather the refusal of some of its actors
to engage in reciprocal relationships of care with indigenous peoples. Although timber
extraction is inequitable, Joel experiences it as a process in which social relations are
created and maintained across time with non-indigenous people, something that has
not happened with Pluspetrol employees.
What follows includes insights from 40 months of ethnographic fieldwork with
Asháninka/Ashéninka people between 2007 and 2020 in the adjacent Bajo Urubamba,
Ene and Tambo valleys. Throughout this time, I have implemented different kinds of
interviews with indigenous and non-indigenous interlocutors, including unstructured
life history interviews with Joel and other key informants. The article is also informed by
my review of dozens of documents related to timber deals and compensation payments
from Pluspetrol in different comunidades, and my participation in communal assemblies
that included discussions with timber company and Pluspetrol employees.
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Three Readings of Conflicts over Resource Extraction
Resource extraction has produced and reinforced patterns of inequality in Latin Amer-
ica, undermined social trust, fragmented social organisation, and largely failed to comply
with indigenous rights recognised in international agreements (Schilling-Vacaflor and
Flemmer, 2015; Leifsen, Guzman-Gallegos and Schilling-Vacaflor, 2017). Peru, with a
resource export-oriented economy, is illustrative of this context (Bury, 2005; Bebbing-
ton and Hinojosa Valencia, 2011). Advocates of extractive development celebrate Peru’s
poverty reduction, from 60 percent of the population living below the poverty line in
2003 to 21.8 percent in 2015, as proof of its effectiveness (World Bank, n.d.). The expan-
sion of hydrocarbon, mining and timber concessions is a continuation of an extractive
development agenda justified as a pathway to progress in the wake of Peru’s internal
war (Sarmiento Barletti, 2021). In Atalaya, progreso (progress) is discussed as plans to
connect it to Lima by road, as well as building roads and sidewalks in town, a larger
plaza and airport, astroturf football pitches and swimming pools, and buildings to host
tourists who rarely arrive (see Harvey, 2010 on development as concrete infrastructure
in Peru). ‘Progress’ is to be funded by the expansion of timber and hydrocarbon extrac-
tion in the province, the jobs and business they will bring, and the royalties paid by
hydrocarbon companies.
Peru is also the site of dozens of conflicts over natural resource extraction. The
Ombudsman’s Office reported 139 conflicts during 2011–2016, with 50 deaths and
over 750 injuries (La República, 2016). Protests in Atalaya have included marches,
the invasion of hydrocarbon sites and river blockades to disrupt supplies to extraction
bases. There are three main scholarly positions on why these conflicts take place. For
the first – the most common in Peru – conflicts are the result of governance failures
such as poor conflict management and prevention, deficient redistribution of royal-
ties from resource extraction and a lack of participatory spaces for the communities
affected by extraction (Damonte, 2012; Tanaka, 2012). The solution is discussed as pol-
icy reforms to improve the governance of extractive activities through more effective and
equitable redistribution policies, extending more effective participation to indigenous
and local peoples, more transparent national and subnational investment of royalties,
and improved regulation and enforcement of environmental standards (Merino, 2014).
Yet, the emphasis on governance and policy reform carries little critical consideration
for the development trajectory on which resource extraction and related policies are
formed and implemented (Merino, 2018). Furthermore, it does not consider the struc-
tures and power asymmetries between the stakeholders in resource extraction and how
these inequalities play out at the local level.
The second reading, political ecology, addresses these analytical shortcomings by
engaging with clashes over resource extraction as ‘ecological distribution conflicts’
(Martinez-Alier and O’Connor, 1996) in which local men and women defend – against
the state or the market – their access to and/or control over the resources extracted
and/or affected by extractive processes (Martinez-Alier, 2002; Li, 2015). On this reading,
also discussed as the ‘environmentalism of the poor’ (Guha and Martínez-Alier, 1997),
indigenous and local peoples are not driven into conflicts over resource extraction by
environmentalism but by their experience of the environment as a source of their liveli-
hoods. These conflicts are understood analytically as environmental justice struggles,
caused by the structural inequalities that drive formal and informal land and resource
dispossession, and the unequal burden of pollution and/or forest degradation experi-
enced by communities in the vicinity of extractive ventures (e.g. mines, hydrocarbon
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sites, timber concessions) and/or related activities (e.g. smelters, pipelines, sawmills).
However, the focus on resources as part of indigenous and local people’s livelihoods
may gloss over their cultural understandings of conflicts.
The third reading, political ontology, engages with these understandings to argue that
conflicts are about the defence of the relations that people have with the non-human enti-
ties they share their territories with (Escobar, 2016). From this perspective, conflicts are
not about poorly designed and/or implemented policies or about the defence of liveli-
hoods but are struggles over different assumptions about what exists – including ‘nature’
(De la Cadena, 2015). Understanding nature as part of a wider decolonial project, these
scholars propose that plants, animals, forests and mountains are not simply resources
over which conflicts are enacted, but they are active participants in the struggle against
extractive activity as they are also ‘threatened by the neoliberal wedding of capital and
the state’ (De la Cadena, 2010; Blaser, 2013). This reading has been criticised for general-
ising and essentialising a wide range of indigenous people’s experiences and engagements
with nature and natural resources, as well as historical trajectories (Ramos, 2012; Bessire
and Bond, 2014).
Although the three readings have shortcomings, they reveal different aspects that
may be at play in conflicts. However, they all emphasise collective responses (e.g. com-
munities, social movements and networks), an emphasis that homogenises the individual
experiences and strategies that mediate people’s desires and strategies regarding extrac-
tive activities. In what follows, I argue that individual perspectives like Joel’s give us
a deeper understanding of the different strategies through which indigenous and local
peoples engage with different kinds of resource extraction. This focus is important given
that resource extraction governance encourages individual strategies in rural communi-
ties to escape economic poverty (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Bebbington and Hinojosa
Valencia, 2011).
Noshire and Reciprocal Relationships of Care
In 2009, 47.6 percent of children under five years old in Atalaya were chronically mal-
nourished (Díaz, 2010). At the time, my Asháninka/Ashéninka interlocutors discussed
food scarcity as the result of different kinds and scales of extractive activity, which
reduced the amount of food they could fish, hunt and grow. This forced them to rely
on cash incomes to buy food, most commonly by working in logging ventures and/or
planting cash crops. Like other Asháninka/Ashéninka areas, households in the Bajo
Urubamba ‘are integrated and knowledgeable participants in a wider capitalist econ-
omy’ (Killick, 2008; Peralta and Kainer, 2008).
For some of my interlocutors, addressing game and land productivity shortages
by rebuilding their relationships with aipatsite (our earth) and the ashitarori (own-
ers/masters of animals) was central to ensuring food and land productivity (Sarmiento
Barletti, 2021). As I was told repeatedly, these non-human beings will only interact
positively with those who hold their end of a reciprocal relationship of care. For
example, aipatsite, the physical earth and a non-human being that allows people to
grow food, will withdraw its productivity, and thus people’s ability to grow food, if the
land is not worked in a socially constructive manner or if people log too many trees.
Similarly, the ashitarori will release animals for hunters only if they do not overhunt
them and stay away from their homes. Many of my interlocutors explained shortages
as these non-human beings rejecting extractive activity and refusing to engage with
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people, share their productivity, and release their animals for people to hunt and fish
(Sarmiento Barletti, 2016).
In one interview I asked Joel about the impact of logging and cacao and coffee gardens
in comunidades on the non-human forest beings that he had assured me existed. Joel
agreed on the importance of rebuilding relationships with non-human beings. He said it
was obvious that kiatsi, the ashitarori of fish, was releasing less fish because Pluspetrol’s
boat traffic angered it. He continued:
I don’t know what we could do. Some people say [non-human beings] will
return if [Pluspetrol leaves], that we have to show aipatsite we can work
together and live well. But you’ve seen how hard it is to hunt and fish. We
have to work timber if we want to live well because there is nothing else
we can do. And we will have to grow more cacao and coffee because there
is not enough food for everyone, so we have to buy food or get funds for
a fish farm. [… ] Yes, [non-humans] will not like it, but what can we do!
There is no choice. If plants don’t grow as they used to [because aipatsite
has stopped sharing its productivity], we’ll have to use fertiliser so that they
do, we’ll have to learn. [… ] It makes me sad, but what are we going to do?
How are we going to feed our children or buy them notebooks so that they
go to school and progress? How will we buy medicines when they’re sick?
[Hydrocarbon companies] won’t share with us to make up for what they
are doing so we need to find a way around it. (… ) It isn’t like when my
grandparents lived and there was game and fish for everyone to share. (Joel
Bardales, 2008)
Joel is proposing a strategy through which self-sufficiency and autonomy is being pur-
sued at the expense of relations with non-humans, a necessary yet difficult sacrifice in
a context of food scarcity. For my Asháninka/Ashéninka interlocutors, those who hold
reciprocal relationships of care recognise each other’s noshire (my heart/soul), the seat
of a person’s ability to feel, remember and make choices (Weiss, 1975). ‘Knowing’ how
to feel sorrow for the suffering of others, love, and happiness are emotions which are
central to how my interlocutors understand everyday relations of care; these emotions
are counterpoised to anger, sadness and envy, all described as destructive to everyday
relations (see Overing and Passes, 2000 for similar cases in Amazonia). Furthermore, as
noted for other indigenous Amazonian groups (Belaunde, 2001), those who hold recip-
rocal relationships of care share the products of their work (e.g. food and money) and
are open to receiving from others when offered the same treatment, thus mutually recog-
nising their noshire. Yet, as Joel explained in a separate conversation, people prefer to
share their work through mingas (collective work parties) as there is not enough food
to share as in the past.
Sharing one’s work and being open to receive that of others in relationships that
are renewed through mingas has become central to the Asháninka/Ashéninka moral
economy at a time when people cannot produce, share and receive food as they expected
to do in the past. Families organise mingas and invite their male kin and friends to
help them complete work-intensive tasks such as clearing forest to burn a new garden,
plant and harvest cash crops, extract timber or build a house. By participating in mingas
people renew bonds of friendship and reciprocity with others in their comunidad, as they
attend the mingas of those who attend theirs to repay their work. Although attendance
is voluntary, people gossip about those that fail to reciprocate. Attendance is generally
understood as a desire to share one’s work, but also of the host couple’s openness to share
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with their guests by feeding them a special meal (usually roasted chicken or chicken soup
with spaghetti and potatoes) and manioc beer. Although mingas are about work, they
are usually fun for participants who normally work on their own or with their wives and
children, or sons-in-law if they have them. Participants expect that when they organise
a minga the organisers of the mingas they have attended will renew the relationship by
participating.
Joel’s neighbours described him as a productive member of his comunidad because
he had acquired his material possessions by working together with his family as well
as organising large mingas for his coffee and cacao gardens. Joel was admired for
attending all the mingas he was invited to or sending someone from his household
when he was unable to participate. At mingas he would start to work before everyone
else and joked with and teased other participants to keep the group’s morale up. In
his own mingas he made sure everyone had enough manioc beer to drink and food
to eat. His behaviour was described as encompassing the reciprocal relationships of
care expected of people who recognise each other’s noshire. These reciprocal relation-
ships of care are present in how Joel recounts his interactions with actors in timber
extraction.
Timber Relations in Atalaya
Most Asháninka/Ashéninka men I know have worked timber since their teens; logging
is so common in the area that it has become central to discourses of masculinity. My
interlocutors described their engagement in logging as instructional, as they improved
their Spanish, learned how to drink cane alcohol, smoke cigarettes and interact with
mestizos.
There are three main ways in which indigenous men in the Bajo Urubamba valley par-
ticipated in timber extraction (see Killick, 2007, 2008 for similar experiences in Ucayali
River Ashéninka comunidades). In the first and most common, timber is extracted from
concessions or comunidades in less populated tributaries as few comunidades in the
Bajo Urubamba have precious hardwoods (cedar and mahogany) after decades of log-
ging. Companies hire indigenous men and transport them to camps where they work
12-hour shifts in teams of 2–3 dozen workers to fell trees with chainsaws, cut them
into logs, clear paths in the forest to roll the logs to rivers, and travel with the timber
downriver to sawmills in Atalaya. These operations use tractors to move logs within the
forest but also to open roads in the forest to move timber faster, and less visibly, than
by river. In 2019, Atalaya province had 295 km of informal roads built in the vicinity
of comunidades; almost one quarter of all new roads in the Peruvian Amazon that year
(MINAM, 2020). Most indigenous men work for patrones for 1–6 months every year
and make between GB£100–150 per month (when Peru’s minimum wage is just under
GB£250). The relatively small numbers of women who work in timber camps as cooks
are paid around GB£80–100. They are commonly married women who join their hus-
bands or young unmarried women. I know of many who became pregnant with the
children of mestizo men and returned with them to their comunidades where in at least
a dozen of those cases the men were later elected as headmen (Hewlett, 2017).
The second option is carried out to cover seasonal expenses like those associated
with schooling. Commonly, groups of 5–10 men – a couple of older men and their
sons, sons-in-law, or nephews – fall 1–2 trees without conferring with their comunidad’s
leaders. As the permits required by Peru’s forestry service for timber extraction and sale
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are difficult and expensive to get (Monterroso and Larson, 2018), men sell the logs
at a cut price to patrones who launder them with logs they extract from concessions
(Salisbury, López and Vela Alvarado, 2011). Patrones are keen for these arrangements
for cheap timber – in 2009 a cubic foot (ft3) of mahogany was worth GPB£3 in the legal
market in Atalaya, but Joel and his workgroup received GPB£0.60/ft3. This practice is
risky as the forestry service fines comunidades when they catch people selling timber
without the required paperwork rather than fining violators. A 2018 protest led by Joel
that paralysed Atalaya for a week demanded the cancellation of hundreds of fines owed
by comunidades to the government, and the relaxation of requirements for the permits
needed for comunidades to extract and sell timber.
The third option is through agreements that comunidades hold with patrones to
extract timber from their forests. All comunidades in the Bajo Urubamba were titled at
the time of research, thereby being granted a degree of control over logging ventures (for
logging relations in other land regimes, see Salisbury, López and Vela Alvarado, 2011;
Feather, 2011). Patrones obtain all the necessary permits and sign agreements with comu-
nidades, negotiating with their leaders how much timber will be extracted and at what
price, and will later deduct extraction expenses from the comunidad’s profits. Patrones
commonly employ local men (as labourers) and women (as cooks), who receive individ-
ual wages, while the profits from the agreement are divided between all of the comu-
nidad’s households. The deals may also include material goods like small hydroelectric
engines or outboard engines to be shared by comunidad members. One of the dangers
with these arrangements is that, following Peruvian law, jefes (headpeople) can sign
legally binding agreements for comunidades. The accounts that patrones presented to
comunidades that I have reviewed held evidence of patrones giving money to jefes, buy-
ing them food and alcohol in Atalaya, covering their expenses at hostels, or giving them
gallons of petrol throughout the year; adding up to thousands of GB£ in a single year.
Patrones book these expenses as loans to the comunidad and demand payment later, in
an updated version of enganche relations where indigenous men were paid in advance for
their work with industrially made products (Garcia Hierro, Hvalkof and Gray, 1998).
The system was based on indigenous workers never knowing how much their work was
worth in relation to the materials they received, and being unable to pay their debts as
the enganche renewed every time they received more goods. Today, comunidades are the
debtors and pay back their loans in timber, yet they keep signing these agreements as they
are the easiest way for them to profit from their forests, with less effort involved than
cultivating cash crops. However, most timber income, either from work for patrones
or the funds that families receive from comunidad deals with patrones, is controlled by
men. My female interlocutors noted this excluded them from accessing market products
or making decisions about household expenditure, despite the extra pressure on them
to feed their children during the months their partners are away working timber. The
challenges to the participation of indigenous women in the governance of their commu-
nities and resources is common throughout the Peruvian Amazon (Sarmiento Barletti
et al., 2020). Typically, men travel to urban centres to sell cash crops and control the
income that comes from work in gardens by both men and women. Over the years I
have witnessed more women travelling with men to Atalaya when they receive their pay
in order to keep part of it for food-related expenses. Notably, government cash transfer
programmes for economically-poor families like Programa Juntos are paid to women.
Despite rights abuses throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Garcia
Hierro, Hvalkof and Gray, 1998), the accounts I recorded of life in the villages created
around patrones were positive. These accounts emphasise that understanding the
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different dimensions of conflicts across the extractive frontier requires an awareness
of the ways in which both the past and present are imagined and mobilised around
resource extraction (Himley, 2014). Like Gow’s (1991) indigenous Yine interlocutors
in the Bajo Urubamba, Asháninka/Ashéninka people described this period as a process
in which they learned to live together in villages, stopped fighting, and underwent
a creative process in terms of social relations. In this recounting of the past, small
kin-based groups moved to live in villages set around large farms or timber and
rubber camps where they intermarried and created compadrazgo relationships with
other people, producing new kinship networks that included patrones (and some-
times their wives) and their foremen as fathers, compadres/comadres and godfathers/
godmothers.
Varese (1968) described these processes as evidence that Asháninka/Ashéninka peo-
ple are fully aware of the power of non-indigenous actors and react to it in their own
terms. For example, Chevalier (1982), on the basis of work conducted elsewhere in
Asháninka/Ashéninka territory, described compadrazgo as ‘a means of concrete resis-
tance to the most immediate threats of exploitation and poverty’. In similar vein, for
Killick (2008) both Asháninka/Ashéninka groups and patrones attempt to control their
interactions by deploying cultural institutions including compadrazgo relationships and
related idioms of support and care. As Joel explained:
We log a few trees when we need to buy clothes for our children or pots for
our wives. I’ve worked timber! My father worked timber too. Who hasn’t
worked timber? [… ] Some people go to work for patrones, others go to
the forest with their brothers and nephews and fell one, two, three trees
and sell them to people they know in Atalaya to make ends meet. You can
go to Atalaya and talk nicely [to patrones] and get a fair price. Sometimes
they’ll give you loans when you need cash for your family and will let you
pay them back in timber. (Joel Bardales, 2007)
Within this context, Joel described his father’s patrón in a positive light:
[He] was my godfather and used to give me gifts when I was a boy. If you
worked hard, they were fine. I sell my timber to the son of my father’s
patrón and he is always fair and sometimes will pay a bit extra when I
really need the money. He knows how to feel sorrow [sabe tener pena]. He
even supported me when I was campaigning for mayor and when I had legal
problems over my house in Atalaya. He felt sorrow for me and wanted to
help. (Joel Bardales, 2007)
Joel portrayed his father’s patrón, who became his godfather and thus his father’s com-
padre, and his godfather’s son as people who ‘know how to feel sorrow’, framing their
interactions in idioms of support and care. From Joel’s perspective, the relationships built
and nurtured in timber extraction present a pathway to self-sufficiency. His interactions
with Pluspetrol, as I discuss below, do not.
Camisea and the Refusal of Reciprocal Relationships of Care
When Camisea became active in 2004, Atalaya province (in Ucayali Region) was not to
benefit from the Fondo de Desarrollo Socioeconómico de Camisea (FOCAM, Camisea
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Fund for Socioeconomic Development) because the site is in Cusco Region, on the
upper Bajo Urubamba. FOCAM is a government scheme to transfer funds from natural
gas royalties to subnational jurisdictions, which was required by the Inter-American
Development Bank, who financed Camisea, after pressure from indigenous organi-
sations and their NGO allies so that comunidades would benefit from the extractive
venture (Corral, Henderson and Miranda, 2016; see Ross, 2009 on the civil society
pressure). Following a process that included input from the indigenous Matsigenka
comunidades adjacent to Camisea and their organisations, it was decided that the funds
would prioritise work in the comunidades in the project’s area of impact; however,
these elements were not respected in FOCAM’s implementation. Nueva Esperanza and
the other seventeen comunidades on the Atalaya side of the river were not initially
compensated by Pluspetrol for its impact either because no extraction takes place on
that side or because no pipelines transporting gas cross it. However, Atalaya province
is downriver from Camisea and is thus affected by liquified gas spills on the Bajo
Urubamba as the pipeline leaked five times during 2005–2006 and there have been
more spills since (Mongabay, 2006). Atalaya is also the logistical centre for all extractive
and exploratory hydrocarbon activity in the area, which has led to a significant rise in
large boats transporting supplies to different sites. Boat traffic creates waves that turn
over the canoes used locally for fishing and transport and has also led to reduced fishing
yields.
In 2004, as Atalaya’s demands for a share of FOCAM were getting nowhere, Joel
was a councillor in the Provincial Municipality of Atalaya yet soon thereafter became
interim mayor when the incumbent resigned. Joel told me that at the time he saw him-
self as a representative of indigenous peoples rather than of the people of Atalaya as a
whole. His greatest worry was Camisea’s impact on comunidades, and so he decided
to concentrate his efforts on FOCAM and investing it in comunidades, because Atalaya
was profiting from the business brought by the demand for services from the compa-
nies with concessions in the area. In his first move as mayor, Joel travelled to Lima to
negotiate for a share of FOCAM:
I showed up [at the Ministry of Economics and Finance] and told the recep-
tionist that I was the Mayor of Atalaya Province in Ucayali Region and
showed her my credentials. She told me to wait. I was prepared to wait for
days. We’ve been abandoned by the government since I can remember, it
has never felt sorrow for us. [… ] [A] man, all dressed up, came and invited
me to an office. He told me he was an adviser to one of the Vice Minis-
ters [… ] I was very angry [that Atalaya’s share of FOCAM had not been
approved] but I controlled myself. [… ] I told him that we indigenous peo-
ple were worried and had not been listened to by the government. I told
him about our right [to free, prior and informed consent recognised in the
International Labour Organization’s Convention 169] that the government
had not respected [… ] that we suffer because of Camisea, and that they
were doing nothing to help us. (Joel Bardales, 2007)
He continued:
He told me, ‘you must understand that neither the gas nor the [pipeline]
come from Atalaya’. He said that there was no pollution, that [Camisea]
was safe. I told him that wasn’t true, that fish tastes and smells different, that
there is less fish because of all the boats but he didn’t want to listen to me.
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He didn’t know how to feel sorrow for us, he didn’t think of me as someone
with noshire. We suffer from hunger and sadness yet the government and
[Pluspetrol] make so much money. I told him that I didn’t throw my rubbish
in his house, so why did he let [Pluspetrol] throw its rubbish in mine! [… ]
I told him he didn’t know how we live, that he should come visit us. (Joel
Bardales, 2007)
In Joel’s experience, the civil servant did not recognise him as someone worthy of
reciprocal relationships of care. Joel returned to Atalaya and led hundreds of protesters
in cutting access to Camisea by blocking the Bajo Urubamba and Atalaya’s airstrip.
Protesters demanded compensation from Pluspetrol, as they perceived its activities
led to diminished fishing and hunting. The government and Pluspetrol became des-
perate as the protest moved into the dry season, because the river would be too
shallow for the company’s larger boats to go upriver, and called for negotiations.
Joel explained:
[W]e were invited to negotiate, to meet the Vice Minister [of Economics and
Finance] and talk. [… ] The Vice Minister was a good guy, and he wanted to
help us. He came to visit us and learn how we live. [… ] We met in Atalaya,
and he drank manioc beer and ate fish with us. Some people brought him a
[traditional tunic] and he wore it [… ] he wore a [headdress] too. He was so
happy! [… ] Politicians never do that; he wanted to help us because he had
seen how we live and had felt sorrow for us. He talked to us and listened
to us and saw our sadness and felt sorrow for us. He knew that we have
noshire. He even gave me his [mobile] number and told me to call him next
time I was in Lima as he would receive me in his office and put me in a
hotel. (Joel Bardales, 2007)
In contrast to his visit to the Ministry, Joel recounted that the Vice Minister had come
to listen and negotiate rather than impose his own ideas and had been open to recip-
rocate what he received, which Joel understood as recognition of his noshire. For Joel,
regardless of what his intentions may have actually been, the Vice Minister played a key
part in Atalaya’s achievement of FOCAM funds. Atalaya Province received 1.5 percent
(around GB£3 million) of FOCAM’s annual budget and was exempted from having to
pay sales tax for a decade. FOCAM funds are commonly spent on roads, pavements and
municipal buildings in the town of Atalaya. Exceptions are made in election years when
the mayor or vice mayor runs for office and funds are commonly used to purchase gifts
for comunidades to sway their inhabitants’ votes. The protest also led to comunidades
receiving compensation payments from Pluspetrol for disturbios fluviales (fluvial dis-
turbances), an acceptance by the company of the impact of the boat traffic supplying
Camisea. These payments are received with complaints about their meagreness as the
company is rich but its payments do not offset the impact and the cost of the food they
purchase due to fish scarcity. For example, Joel’s comunidad received GB£3,000 for the
2009–2012 period to be shared between 65 families. Pluspetrol refused to recognise any
impact from gas spills on the comunidades in the Atalaya side of the valley, arguing that
they were too far away from Camisea for any serious impact.
Joel ran for re-election in 2006 and lost to a member of a powerful timber family,
who promised to invest FOCAM funds on the town, reproducing urban Atalaya’s ideals
of ‘progress’. Joel explained:
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They didn’t like me because I fought for comunidades [… ] People said
‘Bardales wants to give all the money to the indios [Indians] so they live
better than us.’ And you know what? That would have been fair! Atalaya
now has paved roads, a new plaza, new buildings, but the comunidades are
still suffering from hunger. [… ] We cut timber and plant cacao and coffee
to make money but now we have to spend money buying food [… ] Before
the [hydrocarbon companies] there was always food, my father would go
hunting and bring something back a few hours later. [… ] He had to work
for a patrón, but they weren’t always that bad. (Joel Bardales, 2008)
He continued:
[Pluspetrol] is worse than a patrón. [It] sends its [community officers] to tell
us what to do and gives us propinas [pocket money, given the inadequate
compensations]. But those guys just want the best for their own patrones
and nothing for the people who are hungry because of their projects. They
don’t know how to feel sorrow for us [… ] They treat us as if we had no
noshire. They have so much but they won’t share, they don’t know how to
share. And they won’t even drink manioc beer or eat with us. They don’t
even want to give us jobs, we just have to wait for their propinas. (Joel
Bardales, 2008)
Joel’s take on Pluspetrol’s community officers is in stark contrast to his experience with
the Vice Minister, another actor he related to resource extraction. In my encounters
with Pluspetrol’s community officers in the Bajo Urubamba, all were non-indigenous
Peruvians and monolingual in Spanish. They travel in large metal boats with outboard
engines (a stark contrast to local wooden canoes), wear uniforms (long-sleeved denim
shirts with the company’s logo on it, jeans and boots), eat their own packed meals, sleep
in their own tents and refuse to drink manioc beer. When I have asked them why, their
replies have included not being able to drink on the job, that they may get sick from
drinking manioc beer (because it is made with untreated water), or that they found it
disgusting as its base is chewed manioc and sweet potatoes.
Joel experienced their reluctance to drink and eat with people in the comunidades
they visit as a refusal to participate in a reciprocal relationship. This refusal is confirmed
by how community officers run their meetings. Despite demands for greater discus-
sion and compensation, Pluspetrol’s interventions in villages are swift and based around
telling people what the company is doing and how much money they will receive over
the next period. Indigenous people’s requests for work are turned down for reasons
including the high-tech nature of the extraction process or that most indigenous men do
not have identity cards or secondary school certificates. In most of the meetings between
comunidad inhabitants and Pluspetrol’s community officers in which I have participated,
the latter responded to demands for better compensation by arguing that Pluspetrol
was already paying royalties to the government and gave money to the regional indige-
nous organisation (GB£26,000 annually), such that villagers should be directing their
complaints to the government and their own organisation’s leaders. By contrast with
Joel’s experience with the Vice Minister, Pluspetrol does not negotiate – the comunidad
must either take the money or leave it. For Joel, this confirms Pluspetrol’s refusal to cre-
ate reciprocal relationships with Asháninka/Ashéninka people or to recognise them as
having noshire. They refuse to share even though the large amount of cargo that goes
upriver to Camisea daily testifies to their wealth. The money Pluspetrol compensates
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comunidades with – the ‘little gifts’ Joel referred to earlier – does not reflect a desire to
share or feel sorrow for others despite their obvious suffering.
The demands that Joel makes of Pluspetrol in those same meetings and in larger
forums are sometimes discomforting to watch as they are violent, emotional and differ
from how Asháninka/Ashéninka men engage with others in everyday interactions. He
speaks loudly, rocking his body back and forth as he points at community officers with
his left arm and slaps his right thigh with his right arm, rhythmically. He tells them that
they are rich yet stingy, that they do not care about making people suffer and that they
should feel ashamed of profiting from people’s misery. He tells them that if he owned the
company he would employ everyone who needed a job to share his profits, and reminds
them that they are only able to work in the area because so many Asháninka/Ashéninka
people died fighting Sendero Luminoso. His performance resembles the ritual demands
that my interlocutors described unsatisfied ayompari (exchange partners) in the past as
making in cases of unreciprocated trades (see Weiss, 1975). An ayompari would try to
publicly shame his partner, showing everyone else that although he had given plenty
and had not been reciprocated adequately, he was still able to live well. Joel positions
himself in the same way in the verbal exchanges over Pluspetrol’s behaviour towards
his comunidad and the impact of its work on the river and forest, taking the moral high
ground in relation to the exchange that has been refused. In recognising the immorality of
hydrocarbon companies, both rich and stingy, these demands are made in full knowledge
that they will not be reciprocated. But they are also made to show the company that
people are still striving to have dignified lives despite their suffering. As he told me:
[Hydrocarbon] companies are greedy and don’t know how to feel sorrow
for others [… ] would they ever give us a loan or a job? Never! Pluspetrol
won’t leave even if we have told them to, and the government will bring
more [hydrocarbon] companies, so we need to look to our own develop-
ment, use our money from timber to buy what we need, and open larger
gardens to plant coffee and cacao and live well. (Joel Bardales, 2009)
Joel’s point about Pluspetrol not knowing how to share is not just about redistribution,
but about the refusal to enter into reciprocal relationships of care between actors who
recognise each other’s noshire. The issue that Joel brings up concerns the impossibility
of creating reciprocal relationships of care that have happened with timber extraction
and those who participate in it. Despite its impacts, it supports the reproduction of life
in comunidades as individuals pursue self-sufficiency and autonomy.
Conclusion
Earlier I referred to three frameworks through which scholars examine the conflicts over
resource extraction in Latin America. It may be that conflicts over resource extraction
are the product of defective governance, or are ecological distribution conflicts, or are
ontological conflicts over what ‘nature’ really is. These readings are helpful as they show
the multiplicity of issues at different levels that are feeding conflicts over resource extrac-
tion in Peru and beyond. In trying to understand the motivations of individuals on the
ground, whose lives are intertwined with extractive activities in different ways, I pro-
posed a fourth reading of conflicts in terms of the reproduction and refusal of reciprocal
relations of care – and thus the conditions for the reproduction of life – between indige-
nous communities and actors related to different natural resource extraction ventures.
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Examining Joel’s experiences through a relational moral economy enables us to obtain a
better understanding of the micropolitics of engagement strategies with different kinds
of resource extraction, including conflicts. This sheds light on how individuals attempt to
engage with resource extraction ventures through their moral economies and the social
relations underlining them.
Joel’s current strategy emphasises the reproduction of human relationships of care
that support self-sufficiency and autonomy. This has been possible with actors involved
in timber extraction but has not happened with those involved in natural gas extraction
at Camisea. His statements seem to indicate a possible future where reciprocal relation-
ships of care between people are upheld at the expense of relations with non-human
beings. However, given the male dominance of timber extraction practices, women may
be worse off in this possible future as they lose influence in deciding how communities
and households spend funds, which is critical at a time of food scarcity. Finally, examin-
ing individual strategies like Joel’s will become more important as the extractive frontier
continues to expand in the Amazon and Latin America as part of the reconstruction
effort after the COVID-19 pandemic, given that governance mechanisms for extractive
activities have encouraged individual strategies to escape economic poverty at the local
level (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Bebbington and Hinojosa Valencia, 2011).
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